Brigham Young University Law School

BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs (1965 –)

1980

Clyde Hutcheson v. Larry Gleave, Patricia Gleave
Deloy Shaw and Helen Shaw v. Brief of Appellant
Utah Supreme Court

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc2
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; funding for digitization provided by the
Institute of Museum and Library Services through the Library Services and Technology Act,
administered by the Utah State Library, and sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library; machinegenerated OCR, may contain errors.
Tex R. Olsen; Attorney for Plaintiff- AppellantK. L. Mciff; Attorney for Defendants-Respondents
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellant, Hutcheson v. Gleave, No. 16944 (Utah Supreme Court, 1980).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc2/2228

This Brief of Appellant is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme
Court Briefs (1965 –) by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
.............
,... ...
~

CLYDE HUTCHESON,

)

Plaintiff and
Appellant,

)
)

-vs-

NO. 16944

LARRY GLEAVE, PATRICIA GLEAVE
DELOY SHAW and HELEN SHAW,
Defendants and
Respondents.

)

)
)

******************
BRIEF OF APPELLANT

******************
Appeal from the Judgment of the
Sixth Judicial District Court for Piute County
Honorable Don V. Tibbs, Judge

Tex R. Olsen
Olsen and Chamberlain
76 South Main Street
Richfield, Utah
84701
Telephone
896-4461
Attorney for PlaintiffAppellant
K. L. Mciff
Jackson, Mciff & Mower
151 North Main Street
Richfield, Utah
84701
Telephone 896-5441
Attorney for DefendantsRespondents

F J l ED
,JUI

9

1980

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

************
CLYDE HUTCHESON,

)

Plaintiff .and
Appellant,

)
:

)

-vs-

NO. 16944
)

LARRY GLEAVE, PATRICIA GLEAVE
DELOY SHAW and HELEN SHAW,

:

)

Defendants and
Respondents.
7,

·;'(

·l~

*

-J\

**

)
-!~

1:: ~' ·k ·k ..k

·k

~~

•k -J\

aJr ·k

*

a](

*

BRIEF OF APPELLANT
-Jc ·k 7c

*

..,,

**

--Jc

--Jc

.,,

•k

7~

..,~

*

Appeal from the Judgment of the
Sixth Judicial District Court for Piute County
Honorable Don V. Tibbs, Judge

Tex R. Olsen
Olsen and Chamberlain
76 South Main Street
Richfield, Utah
84701
Telephone
896-4461
Attorney for PlaintiffAppellan t
K. L. Mciff
Jackson, Mciff & Mower
151 North Main Street
Richfield, Utah
84701
Telephone 896-5441
Attorney for DefendantsRespondents.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page No.
STATEMENT OF KIND OF CASE

1

DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT .

2

RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL

2

STATEMENT OF FACTS

2

. . . . . . . . . . . . .

ARGUMENT

8

POINT I
THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN GRANTING A
FORFEITURE OF $40, 000. 00 . . . . . . .
A.

B.

C.

THE CONTRACT OF THE PARTIES WAS NOT CLEAR
AND HAD NO SELF-EXECUTING FORFEITURE
PROVIS ION . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

8

9

NO NOTICE OF INTENTION TO TERMINATE
CONTRACT AND FORFEIT THE PLAINTIFF'S
PAYMENT WAS EVER GIVEN . . . . . . .

14

THE DEFENDANTS CANNOT DISGUISE THE FORFEITURE
BY THEIR WEAK ATTEMPT TO SHOW DAMAGES

18

CONCLUSION . .

20

APPENDIX i

23

APPENDIX ii

24

AUTHORITIES CITED
CASES
Crestview-Holiday Home Owners Association vs. Engh
Floral Company, 545 P2d 1150 (Utah 1976)
Green vs. Palfreyman, 166 P2d 215 (Utah 1946)

13
8

Jacobsen vs. Swan, 3 U2d 59, 278 P2d 294 (1954)

19

Johnson vs. Carma!).; 572 P2d 371 (Utah 1977)

18

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

Karrrrnert Brothers Enterprises vs. Tanque· ve·rda Plaza
Co., 428 P2d 678 (Ariz. 1966) .
Kay vs. Wood, 549 P2d 709 (Utah 1976)
Lamont vs. Evken, 508 P2d 532 (Utah 1973)

15
.

. . .

18

. . ... .

14

Leone vs. Zuniga, 34 P2d 699 (Utah 1934)

12

Miner vs. Dickey, 140 Mich. 518, 103 NW 8.55

12

Parker vs. California State Life Irts. Co., 40 P2d 175
(Utah 1935)
. . . . . . . . .

8

Peck vs. Judd , 7 U2d 420, 326 P2d 712 (1958) .

19

Perkins vs. Spencer, 121 Utah 468, 243 P2d 446 (1952)

19

Peterson vs. Hodges, 239 P2d 180 (Utah 1951)

9

S. T. McKnight Co. vs. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co.,
120 F2d 310 (C.A.A. Minn.) . . . . .
. . . .

9

TEXT REFERENCES
52 Am Jur 245, Tender, §41
17A C.J.S. 497, Contracts, §.407
Specific Performance of Contracts, (3rd Ed.)
Pomeroy, §393, p. 836
..... .

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

14
9

12

IN T°HE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

************
CLYDE HUTCHESON,

)

Plaintiff and
Appellant,

)
)

-vs-

BRIEF OF APPELLANT

:

LARRY GLEAVE, PATRICIA GLEAVE
DELOY SHAW and HELEN SHAW,
Defendants and
Respondents.

)

NO. 16944
)
)

************ ******
STATEMENT OF KIND OF CASE
The Plaintiff entered into an Earnest Money Receipt and
Offer to Purchase Agreement with the Defendants for the purchase of
property known as the "Elbow Ranch" in Piute County, Utah.
Plaintiff made payment to the Defendants of $40,000.00.
Defendants continued in possession of the

prope~ty

The

The

and the parties

continued to negotiate the details of the sale.
The Defendants sold a major portion of the property to a
third party.

Without knowledge of this fact, the Plaintiff com-

menced an action for specific performance.

Later, upon learning of

the binding sale of a highly material portion of the property to a
third party, the Plaintiff's Complaint was amended to seek return of
the $40,000.00 deposit made by him.
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DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
The Lower Court entered a judgment in favor of Defendants
and dismissing Plaintiff's Complaint thereby permitting the
Defendants to retain the Plaintiff's $40, 000. 00 deposit as damages,

RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
The Plaintiff seeks to have the judgment of the Lower
Court reversed and a judgment entered in favor of the Plaintiff fo1
the sum of the $40, 000. 00 ..

STATEMENT OF FACTS
On July 30, 1977, the Defendants listed their ranch
property known as the "Elbow Ranch" for sale with Bushnell Real
Estate Company, which listing was taken by one of its agents,
Cathy Bagley (Exhibit #7).
A legal description of the property sold and a specific
description of the water rights and equipment was not given to
the realtor nor to Plaintiff.

However, a statement of offering

information was prepared by the real estate agent (Exhibit 4f.9) and
made available to the Plaintiff.
The Exhibit provided the ·Elbow Ranch consisted of 3800
deeded acres and approximately 4000 acres of leased school
sections.
The water right with the ranch consisted of a storage
right in Manning Reservoir as well as all rights of Don Springs,
Tibideau Canyon, Swift Springs, and 10/17ths of the first three
and one-half feet of Dry Creek Canyon.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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It was further represented that there was operated on the
property three central irrigating pivots in irrigating approximately 580 acres and mineral rights were available on 3200 acres.
The property was offered for sale to the Plaintiff.
Negotiations were commenced in 1977 which resulted in a series of
signed Earnest Money Agreements, the last of which was executed on
the 28th day of February, 1978,

(Exhibit #12) a copy of which is

annexed to this Brief as Appendix i.
The agreement also refers to and incorporates an earlier
agreement~ which agreement is Exhibit #11,

and attached as a part

of this Brief, as Appendix ii.
The Plaintiff was relying upon the sale of Arizona
property as a ·source for payments required during the year of 1978
(Tr.130, 131

& 132).

The parties knew the full payment was

conditioned upon the Arizona sale and included a handwritten
provision to take care of the problem in Exhibit 4f.12 and which
read:
The balance of 1978 payments is to be
secured by a mortgage on a 42-unit
motel known as the "Time Motel" of
Flagstaff, Arizona, or property of
similar value.
Interest at the rate
of 8-1/2% per annum on the unpaid
portion of the down payment will be
due and payable when the balance of
the 1978 payment is made (No later
than October 15, 1978).
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Payments totaling $40,000.00 were made to Sellers prior
to April 10, 1978 (Tr. 131, L 14 & 15; Tr. 238, L 9-12).
The Sellers were required, as conditions precedent to the
contract, to have the irrigating system in good working order,
furnish an abstract or title insurance showing the Sellers had
good and marketable title to the property being sold.

(See

Exhibit 10)
The pivots were not in reasonable operation on April 10,

1978 (Tr. 27, 32, 37, 49) and, as a matter of fact, the Defendants
have filed a_ lawsuit against the manufacturer and installers of
the irrigation equipment for defective erection (Tr. 121, 245 &
·246).
Defendant Deloy Shaw testified, commencing Tr. 245, Line

30 and continuing Tr. 246:
Q

(Mr. Olsen)

Now, we've talked quite a bit about

the circular sprinkler system and the other day you told us you
were in the Federal District Court in a lawsuit with the manufacturer of this sprinkler equipment.
A

(Mr. Shaw)

Yes.

Q

Who is representing you in that lawsuit?

A

Mr. Mciff.

Q

Now, did the manufacturer sue you or did you sue

A

We sued them.

them?
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In your pleadings or in any statement you have

Q

made, have you claimed that the equipment wasn't put together
properly at the time of the initial installation on the land?
A

Yes.

Q

You're making that claim?

A

Yes.

Q

Are you making a claim that because of the faulty

installation, it just didn't work properly?
A

Yes.

Material portions of the land had been conveyed to Keith
/Barben and separately to Verl Henrie, which were part of the
original Elbow Ranch (Tr. 23

& 24; Tr. 182, 183).

The conveyances

included a conveyance of a part of the water right known as "Don
Spring".

(Exhibits #5

& #6)

The property was to have mineral rights in 3200 acres
which were a major consideration to the Plaintiff (Tr. 124, 125,
126).
At the time the parties met to review the transaction on
April 10, 1978, a title report was presented to the Plaintiff and
his attorney (Exhibit #14).

The title report showed some 18 title

objections, including a reservation by Western Gateway and Storage
Company, formerly, American Packing and Provision Company, a Utah
corporation, in 2165.75 acres and an outstanding mineral lease to
Phillips Petroleµm Company.
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Various matters were discussed on April 10th, including
the Plaintiff's ability to pay as well as the problem with the
mineral rights and for the first time the Plaintiff was pre-

sented with a Uniform Real Estate Contract for his review (Exhibit:
:ff 16).

There was objection to the form of the Agreement and the
Defendants' attorney was to re-draft the agreement and send a
copy to Plaintiff and his attorney (Tr. 100 & Tr. 142, Line 29).
No agreement was ever drafted or presented to the Plaintiff for
his review.
The Defendants continued in possession of the property
and operated it "as usual" during the entire year of 1978 (Tr.
238 & 239).

The parties had a series of contaets with the

Plaintiff personally but at no time did anyone mention an intention to forfeit out the $40,000.00 deposit of the Plaintiff.
On August 17, 1978, the Defendants sold a major part of
the property to a buyer for $700,000.00 (Exhibit #20).
of this contract was given to the Plaintiff.

No notice

On June 6, 1978,

a telephone call had been initiated by the Defendants' attorney
to Plaintiff's attorney, John Robinson, during the negotiations
on ranch property.

Without the knowledge of Mr. Robinson, the

conversation was taped by Mr. Mciff.

The conversation concerned

when additional cash could be put into the Utah venture.

The

discussion was amicable and Defendants reaffirmed that they were
willing to cooperate and finalize the transaction (Tr. 287
through 293).
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A date of June 12th was arrived at as a "cut-off" date
so the Defendants could advise Zions First National Bank of a
date they anticipated payment would be made.

However, the parties

agreed the "cut-off" date was not critical since the Defendant
Sellers had a substantial redemption period.

Mr. Gleave spec-

ulated about the reaction of Zions First National if the payment
was not made by June 12, 1978 as follows:
"I am sure they will, you know, i.f they do file a
notice, why we have still got the 90 days anyway" (Tr. 292, Line
2).

A more detailed analysis of the telephone conversation
is included under Plaintiff's Argument in this Brief.
The Plaintiff received no notice from any party that the
Defendants intended to terminate the contract and forfeit the
$40,000.00 deposit he had made.
The Plaintiff brought an action for specific performance
of the contract.

(R. 1-8)

Upon learning that a major part of

the property had been sold, the Complaint was amended to recover
the $40,000.00 deposited with the Defendants sirice the Defendants
could no longer perform their proposed contract.
At the trial the Defendants did not show any damage
resulted to them.

They did show they made an advantageous

re-sale since they sold

~

part of the

prope~ty

to Virginia Jenkins

for $700,000.00 (Exhibit #7) and the balance of the property
had a value of $433,800.

The Defendants were benefited by the
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sum of $171,300.00 over the Plaintiff's contract (Exhibit #12).

ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN GRANTING A FORFEITURE
OF $40,000.00
A.

THE CONTRACT OF THE PARTIES WAS NOT CLEAR
AND HAD NO SELF-EXECUTING FORFEITURE PROVISION

B.

NO NOTICE OF INTENTION TO TERMINATE CONTRACT
AND FORFEIT THE PLAINTIFF'S PAYMENT WAS EVER
GIVEN

C.

THE DEFENDANTS CANNOT DISGUISE THE FORFEITURE
BY THEIR WEAK ATTEMPT TO SHOW DAMAGES

This Court has had many occasions to consider unearned

(Utah 1935) 40 P2d 175, this Court stated: ''[f]orfeitures have
not been and are not now favored by the law. * * *Any acts or
statements suggesting an intention to keep a contract alive are
liberally construed as a waiver of the right of forfeiture."
Likewise, in the case of Green
1946) 166 P2d 215, the Court stated:

vs·.-

Palfreyman, (Utah

n[f]orfeitures are not

favored, and in interpreting an agreement, every reasonable
presumption should be indulged against an intention to allow a
forfeiture."
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In Peterson vs. Hodges, (Utah 1951) 239 P2d 180, this
Court again stated: "[F]orfeitures are not favored.

Even con-

tracts which expressly provide for a forfeiture will not be
extended beyond the strict and literal meaning of the language
used."
* * *The parties insisting on the forfeiture must comply
strictly with all contract requirements and with conditions
authorizing the forfeiture.

So, when the forfeiture is dependent

on the making of a demand and failure to comply with the demand,
the failure to make a proper, specific and reasonable demand is a
failure to the enforcement of the forfeiture by a Court of law or
equity."

S. T. McKnight Co. vs. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co.,

120 F2d 310 (C.A.A. Minn.) as cited in 17A CJS, Contracts, §407,
p. 497.
In the light of the clear rule of this Court, the specific
contract and conduct of the parties should be reviewed.

A.

THE CONTRACT OF THE PARTIES WAS NOT CLEAR AND
HAD NO SELF-EXECUTING FORFEITURE PROVISION

The parties had a series of negotiations and signed a
series of Earnest Money Agreements, the last of which was executed
February 28, 1978 and incorporated aspart of the previous agreement of December 12, 1977 (See Appendix i and Appendix ii attached
to this Brief).
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In the period of negotiations, several things were discussed.

The discussions included the property, water rights, pivot

sprinklers, permit rights which were to be sold.

The agreement

attaches no real property description or itemization of what was to
be sold.

The Defendants did not own all of the property originally

used as the "Elbow Ranch".

Also, portions of the ranch property

were conveyed by Defendants to others (Tr. 18, L 17; Tr. 22, 23,
24, 36 & 37).

Therefore, the Earnest Money· Agreement itself

contemplated a final contract would be prepared to meet these
specifics. No acceptable final agreement was completed although
Defendants' attorney was to prepare and furnish the Agreement to
Plaintiff (Tr. 100 & Tr. 142, L 29).
The Plaintiff paid to the Defendants $40,000.00 prior to
April 10, 1978.

The balance of the payments to be made in 1978

was to be made· from the sale of 150 acres of farm land to be sold
by the Plaintiff in the State of Arizona (Tr. 132, L 25-28).
Therefore, the parties inserted into their contract the following:
"Balance of 1978 payments is to be secured by a mortgage on a 42unit motel known as the "Time Motel" in Flagstaff, Arizona, or
property of similar value.

Interest at the rate of 8-1/2% per

cent per annum on the unpaid portion of the down payment will be
due and payable when the balance of the 1978 payment is made (no
later than October l5,

l978)."

[emphasis ours]

On August 17, 1978, the Defendants sold a major portion
of the ranch property being purchased ,.by Plaintiff to a Virginia
Jenkins for $700,000.00.

(See Exhibit #20)
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Nevertheless showing his good faith, Plaintiff,
after securing the extension of time for further payments in
1978, authorized the release of his $40,000.00 deposit to the
Defendants for their use (Tr. 194 L 26-30; Tr. 195; Tr. 199).
The Plaintiff did not take possession of the property
in the year of 1978.
the Defendants.

The property was operated "as usual" by

The Defendants grazed their cattle upon the

property and made use of the permit; harvested the alfalfa
which was raised and fed it to their cattle and grazed the
alfalfa fields as they had the previous year (Tr. 159,

I~

26-30;

Tr. 160, L 1-4).
In the continuing contact between Plaintiff and the
Defendants, there was never any

noti~e

or statement made to the

Plaintiff that his interests in the property would be forfeited
unless he paid an additional $160,000.00 by a certain or specific
date.
No notice of the contract negotiations with Virginia
Jenkins was ever given to the Plaintiff and he had no knowle<J.ge of
the transaction until he called one of the Defendants and advised
him that he had an additional $160,000.00 {n the month of August,
1978.

Plaintiff was advised to call the

~eal

eitate agent.

The

real estate agent then told the Plaintiff of the property sale to
Virginia Jenkins (Tr. 113, L 4-27).
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The Earnest Money Receipt (Exhibit #12) makes no

provisi~

for a method of forfeiting any amount of funds and the conduct of
the parties would give no indication of any such intention.
In the case of Leone vs. Zuniga, 34 P2d 699 (Utah 1934)
this Court has discussed the difference between contracts containing self-executing forfeiture provisions and those containing
provisions requiring notice of forfeiture.

The decision approved a

statement from Pomeroy, Specific Pe·rfortnanc·e· 'o'f Contracts (3rd Ed.)
§393, p. 836, and held that where the clause was not absolute,
causing the contract to be automatically void upon default in
payment at the time specified, but rather containing language which
gave the vendor an election to treat the contract as avoided,
required that the vendor, if he intends to avail himself of the
provision, must give the purchaser timely and reasonable notice of
his intention to avoid the contract, or must do some unequivocal
act which unmistakably shows that intention, for the vendor cannot
treat the default alone as terminating the agreement.
The Utah Supreme Court further concurred with the wellreasoned Michigan case of Miner vs. Dick~y, 140 Mich. 518, 103
NW 855, and approved the following language:
* * *The relations between the parties
were contract relations.
It is apparent
that these relations might continue to
exist after the breach of contract by
the vendee; the vendor having the right
to waive the breach, or to forgo her
remedy therefor* * *We do not mean to
hold that parties to such a contract may
not stipulate that. a specified breach or
breaches of the contract shall at once
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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determine the contract relations and work
a forfeiture of the vendee's rights
thereunder.
The contract in this case
does not so stipulate. The provision is
that after breach the vendor shall have
a right to declare the contract void.
The rule that the vendor must terminate
the contract relations by a notice of
forfeiture or otherwise, or that the
defendant must do some act or thing
which of itself determines the contract
relationship, before proceedings to
recover possession of premises can be
begun, is well settled.
In the case of

Crestview~Holiday

ation, Inc., vs. Engh Floral Company,

Home Owners Associ-

(Utah 1976) 545 P2d 1150,

this Court, after holding that the provisions in the contract were
not self-executing and thus requiring some affirmative act on the
part of the seller, stated:
Therefore, the contractual relations between
the seller and the buyer are in existence until
such time as the seller chooses to notify the
defaulting buyer of its election to proceed under
one, or all, of its options.
In so doing, seller
must give the defaulting buyer a reasonable time
within which to cure the default. Without this
notice, the defaulting buyer would not know what
to do. He would not have certain knowledge his
tenancy was at an end. He could assume that the
seller may have waived default, or would elect to
enforce the contract rather than forfeit it; or
he could assume he would be permitted to perform.
The Earnest Money Agreement (Exhibit #12) does not have

any self-executing forfeiture clause.

Therefore, the sellers were

required to give reasonable notice of their intention to declare a
forfeiture of the deposit and to terminate the contract.
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In the case of Lamont vs. F.vken,

(Utah 1973)

508 P2d 532, this Court analyzed a similar situation under a
Uniform Real Estate Contract:
Before a seller of land under a Uniform Real
Estate Contract can exercise any of the options
given him because of a failure on the part
of the purchaser to pay an installment as
promised, he must give the purchaser notice
of the default and a reasonable time in
which to bring the contract current.
The Court then went on to state:
The rule is especially applicable in cases
like the instant one where th~ default was
overlooked by the partiei for some 15
months.
B.

NO NOTICE OF INTENTION TO TERMINATE CONTRACT
AND FORFEIT THE PLAINTIFF'S PAYMENT WAS

EVER GIVEN
The discussion under Sub-section A of this Brief
was of the contract of the parites as· well as the requirement to
give some reasonable notice of an election to forfeit a contract
right.

There must be a notice which would advise of the inter-

pretation placed on the contract and permit some opportunity to
rehabilitate the contract.

The notice requirement was partic-

uarly important in this case since the terms of the contract
needed to be finalized.
In this case, no notice was given to Plaintiff of
any intention to terminate the contract and sell the property
to a third party.
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The Supreme Court of Arizona in the case of Kammert
Brothers Enterprises vs. Tanque Verde Plaza· Compahy,

(Ariz. 1966)

428 P2d 678, stated that a forfeiture notice must be "clear and
unequivocal to be effective."

Stating further that a notice which

"merely declared the contract to be in default fails as a matter
of law to constitute a notice of forfeiture."
The Defendants make no claim that they have given the
Plaintiff notice of any type concerning an. intention to terminate
the contract and forfeit out the $40,000-.00 deposite~ by Plaintiff.
Defendants rely upon a telephone conversation between one of the
Defendants, Mr. Gleave, and the Defendants' attorney, Mr. Mclff,
and Attorney John Robinson in Arizona who was representing the
Plaintiff.

An examination of the conversation, recorded without

the knowledge of Plaintiff's attorney, shows an amicable situation
existed between the parties.

The conversation affirmed the

parties' intention to continue their existing relationship and not
to terminate it.
We set out the telephone conversation commencing Tr. 289
so that it can be reviewed in detail:
MR. McIFF:

What we think we would like to do, John,

not that we want to be difficult at all, but we would
just like to set a cutoff date so that you could tell
that to the people you're dealing with and we can tell
it to the Bank and we can say to the Bank, "Okeh, this
is the day.

If we don't resolve it by then,

~hen

we
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will do something else."

What--can you give us a date

that we can rely on and then we will all go with that?
Could we rely on the 12th?

MR. ROBINSON:

If you would, let me say the 15th and

then that would give us a couple extra days dmm here.
Just in case something screws up again.

MR. McIFF:

What about the 15th., Larry?

Can you

live with that?

MR. GLEAVE:

I think we can live with the 15th, but

it couldn't be any later than that.

MR. McIFF:

Tell your people that Clyde's put some

money in it that he runs the risk of losing and that they
had better be aware of that.
MR. ROBINSON:

I have made them all totally aware of

that.

MR. McIFF:

V\lbat we propose to do then is call Zions

Bank and tell them that's our cutoff date.
MR. ROBINSON:
MR. McIFF:

Yes.

And that we--if we cannot close the deal

on or before that date then we will go-MR. ROBINSON:
MR. McIFF:

Go another route--

Yes, we will go another route and try to

solve our problem.
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MR. ROBINSON:

If it would do any good, I will still

be glad to talk with the people at Zions and let them
know what's happening and why.
MR. McIFF:

Well, of course, Larry has had most of

the contact with them and I know he's talked to them,
what, Larry, fifteen times?
MR. GLEAVE:
MR. McIFF:

Yes.
And Mr. Bushnell from Bushnell Realty

has talked with them.
MR. GLEAVE:

I'll tell them of this development.

MR. ROBINSON:
MR. McIFF:

Okeh.

Okeh.

MR. GLEAVE:

I am sure they will, you know, if they

do file a notice, why we've still got the ninety days
anyway.
MR. ROBINSON:

You still have the redemption period.
But we 1 ll try to keep them from filing

MR. GLEAVE:
notice.
MR. ROBINSON:
MR. McIFF:

Okeh.

John, will you please keep me posted?

MR. ROBINSON:

As soon as I receive any different

information, I'll give you a call.
MR. McIFF:

Okeh, alright.

MR. ROBINSON:

We'll--

Right now, I'm waiting for other

people to give me information and when they do, I'll let
you know.
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MR. McIFF:

Yes, call me as soon as you know anything

so that I can get everything ready from our end, you
know, the paper work and that, I'll get that-It is apparent from the conversation the parties were
cooperating with one another that there was no extreme urgency.

Mr,

Gleave clearly indicated time was not of the essence and even if
they had a problem with their financing institution, "Why we've
still got the ninety days anyway."
The Plaintiff was never advised by his attorney or by any
of the Defendants

there was a cut-off date which would affect his

contract rights (Tr. 301, L 18-28).
The conversation could not be construed to be a "Notice of
Forfeiture" which was clear and unequivocal.

On the contrary, it

can only be interpreted that the parties would work out some other
accommodation.
C.

THE DEFENDANTS CANNOT DISGUISE THE FORFEITURE
BY THEIR WEAK ATTEMPT TO SHOW DAMAGES

In the case of Johnson· vs. Carman, (Utah 1977) 572 P2d 371,
this Court has summarized the law on the damages required to be
shown to support a forfeiture provision.

This Court restated its

holding in Kay vs. Wood, (Utah 1976) 549 P2d 709 as follows:
This Court has long been committed to the
rule that parties to a contract may agree as
to amount of liquidating damages that shall
be paid in the case of a bre~ch, that th~
agreement is enforceable if the ·amount
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stiuplated to is not disproportionate
to t~e.dam~ges actually sustained. The
provision in a contract for the sale of
real property that all payments which
have been made will be forfeited as
liquidated damages will not be enforced
if the_forfeitu:e would be grossly
exce~sive and disproportionate to any
possible loss so as to shock the conscience.
See also Perkins vs. Spen~er, 121 Utah 468,
243 P2d 446 (1952); Jacbb~~h vs. Swan,
3 U2d 59, 278 P2d 294 (1954); .Peck vs. Judd,
7 U2d 420, 326 P2d 712 (1958).

This Court in Perkins vs. Spencer,· sti'pra. specified
evidence to be used to calculate damages at the time of a breach.
These factors are:
~

(1)

Loss of an advantageous bargain;

(2) Any damage to or depreciation of the
property;
(3) Any decline in value due to change in
market value of the property not allowed
in items 1 and 2;
(4) For the fair rental value during the
period of occupancy.
The evidence before the Lower Court must be reviewed concerning the question of damages.

No evidence was offered by the

Defendants concerning the loss of an advantageous bargain.
matter of fact,

As a

the evidence before the Court was that the Defen-

dants had entered into a contract to sell the property to the
Plaintiff for $962,500.00 (Exhibit #12); that a major part of the
property (a water right) was sold to Virginia Jenkins for $700,000.00
(Exhibit #20) and that there remained all of the property except
water from Manning Creek.
$433,800~00,

The remaining property had .a value of . . ·"

(See Exhibit #7) making a total of $1~133,800.00 or

a profitSponsored
of $171,300.00
over the Earnest .Money offer of Plaintiff ..
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The only attempt made by the Defendants to show damage
was that they had anticipated or expected the Plaintiff would seed
part of the crops on the ranch property.

Possession of the ranch

property was never delivered to the Plaintiff and the Defendants
operated the property as usual.

However, for some reason they

claimed the Plaintiff should have planted additional crops and
given Defendants the benefit of those crops.

This view overlooks

the fact that Defendants had possession, use.and occupancy during
the full year 1978 as well as the use of Plaintiff's $40,000.00.
It also overlooks the vital fact that if the Plaintiff
were entitled to possession he was also entitled to all of the
crops produced upon the land.

If Defendants' theory is adopted,

the Defendants should have been accounting to Plaintiff for their
use of the property during the year of 1978.

CONCLUSION
The Earnest Money Offer Contract existing between the
parties contemplated the execution, by the parties, of a final
contract which would describe specifically the property sold by
legal description.

This was required since the property known as

the "Elbow Ranch" was parceled out to several parties before the
contract was entered into by the Plaintiff.

The general description

"Elbow Ranch" was not certain enough to be a completed contract
between the parties.
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The Defendants continued to deal with and encourage the
Plaintiff in entering into a final sales contract during the
full year of 1978; during that ye~r Defendants, with~ut notifying
Plaintiff who had a written contract allowing him until October
15, 1978 to pay the pending installments, sold a major portion
of the property to a third party on August 15, 1978.
The Defendants also failed to give any notice that they
intended to terminate the negotiations and to declare forfeit
the deposit paid by the Plaintiff and failed to give Plaintiff
any notice that would afford him an opportunity to repair any
claimed default or review a proposed final contract.
Further, no damages were proved by Defendants to support
a forfeiture of $40,000.00.
The Appellant respectfully submits to this Court that·
the Judgment of the District Court should be reversed and a
judgment entered in his favor for the $40,000.00 deposit forfeited by order of the Lower Court.

Respectfully submitted,

_,,;;-:~1;:-~---hr-)

. . . . "'- _,______________

-~~L;;,::~~1--ir>~'!:.4_.,.=..f_...t-,.......,.:~"'-

Tex R. Olsen
Olsen and Chamberlain
76 South Main Street
Richfield, Utah
84701

Attorney for PlaintiffAppellant
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